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1 Prologue
Over the past few years, providers such as Google, Mi-
crosoft, and Amazon have started to provide customers
with access to software interfaces allowing them to eas-
ily embed machine learning tasks into their applications.
Overall, organizations can now use Machine Learning as a
Service (MLaaS) engines to outsource complex tasks, e.g.,
training classifiers, performing predictions, clustering, etc.
They can also let others query models trained on their data.
Naturally, this approach can also be used (and is often ad-
vocated) in other contexts, including government collabo-
rations, citizen science projects, and business-to-business
partnerships.
However, if malicious users were able to recover data
used to train these models, the resulting information leak-
age would create serious issues. Likewise, if the inner pa-
rameters of the model are considered proprietary informa-
tion, then access to the model should not allow an adver-
sary to learn such parameters. In this document, we set to
review privacy challenges in this space, providing a sys-
tematic review of the relevant research literature, also ex-
ploring possible countermeasures.
More specifically, we provide ample background infor-
mation on relevant concepts around machine learning and
privacy. Then, we discuss possible adversarial models and
settings, cover a wide range of attacks that relate to private
and/or sensitive information leakage, and review recent re-
sults attempting to defend against such attacks.
Finally, we conclude with a list of open problems that
require more work, including the need for better evalua-
tions, more targeted defenses, and the study of the relation
to policy and data protection efforts.
2 Background
In this section, we provide some background information
and definitions related to machine learning (ML) as well
privacy technologies for ML.
2.1 Machine Learning (ML)
Learning process. ML provides automated methods of
analysis for large sets of data, or to perform tasks that are
too hard to program by hand. The general approach to cre-
ate a machine learning model is as follows [45]:
• Training: Most ML models can be seen as paramet-
ric functions hθ(x) taking an input x and a parameter
vector θ. The input x is often represented as a vec-
tor of values called features. The space of functions
{∀θ, x → hθ(x)} is the set of candidate hypotheses
to model the distribution from which the dataset was
sampled. A learning algorithm analyzes the training
data to find the value(s) of parameter(s) θ. In other
words, during training, an ML algorithm aims to learn
the “characteristics” of some data with respect to a
given “task” – e.g., given enough pictures of pets, the
algorithm should learn to distinguish what differenti-
ates pictures of, say, cats from dogs.
• Validation: The model performance is then validated
on a test dataset, which must be disjoint from the
training dataset in order to measure the model’s gener-
alization. In other words, validation performs a sanity
check to make sure the algorithm has indeed learned
what it is supposed to.
• Inference (or testing): Once training completes, the
model is deployed to make predictions on inputs un-
seen during training: the value of parameters θ are
fixed, and the model computes hθ(x) for new inputs
x. The model prediction may take different forms but,
e.g. for classification, the most common is a vector
assigning a probability for each class of the problem,
which characterizes how likely the input belongs to
that class. In other words, we can now use the algo-
rithm in the wild, and use it for the task at hand – e.g.,
given a picture, the algorithm tells us whether that is
a picture of a cat or a dog.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD). With each function
h and θ, one typically associates a loss L(h, θ), a value
that quantifies the cost of any discrepancies between the
model’s prediction hθ(x) and the true value f(x), over all
examples x (approximated by the training examples) [2].
Training the model h is the process of searching for a value
of θ with the smallest loss, or with a tolerably small loss.
Often, both the model h and the loss L are differentiable
functions of θ. Therefore, training often relies on a pro-
cess called stochastic gradient descent (SGD), where one
repeatedly picks an example x (or batches thereof), calcu-
lates hθ(x), and the corresponding loss, and adjusts θ to
reduce the loss by going in the opposite direction of the
gradient [2]. In a nutshell, SGD is a very common process
used during training to find the settings in the ML algo-
rithm that maximize its accuracy.
Tasks. The process discussed above is typical in what is
referred to as supervised learning. However, ML tasks are
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Figure 1: A simple illustration of how one can use discriminative
vs generative models. The former learns to distinguish between
two classes, i.e., pictures of cats or dogs. The latter estimates
the underlying distribution of a dataset (pictures of cats) and ran-
domly generate realistic, yet synthetic, samples according to their
estimated distribution.
actually commonly divided into two main types, depend-
ing on the structure of the data at hand:
• Supervised learning: an association between inputs
and outputs based on training examples in the form
of inputs labeled with corresponding outputs. If the
output data is categorical, the task is called classi-
fication, and real-valued output domains define re-
gression problems [45]. Classic examples of super-
vised learning tasks include object recognition in im-
ages, machine translation, and spam filtering. In this
setting, the model parameters are adjusted to reduce
the gap between model predictions hθ(x) and the ex-
pected output indicated by the dataset.
• Unsupervised learning: When the method is given
unlabeled inputs, its task is unsupervised. Unsuper-
vised learning considers problems such as clustering
points according to a similarity metric, dimensional-
ity reduction to project data in lower dimensional sub-
spaces, etc [45].
Other types of techniques include reinforcement learning,
which we omit to ease presentation.
ML approaches. ML models can be also categorized de-
pending on the probability distributions they learn. Assum-
ing one has some input data x and wants to classify it into
labels y, then, roughly speaking, one can use either:
• Discriminative models to learn the conditional proba-
bility distribution p(y|x), or
• Generative models to learn the joint probability distri-
bution p(x, y). Among these, Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs) [21] were originally proposed for
unsupervised learning, but now also used for super-
vised and reinforcement learning, and have become
very popular as they learn to generate new data with
the same statistical properties as the training set. The
two kinds of model are exemplified in Figure 1.
Another distinction is based on whether the learning task
is centralized or (somewhat) distributed:
• Centralized learning: in conventional ML method-
ologies, all training data is pooled and stored at a sin-
gle entity, and models are trained on this joint pool.
Figure 2: An overview of the federated learning approach.
• Collaborative/federated learning: multiple partici-
pants, each with their own training dataset, construct
a joint model by training a local model on their own
data, but periodically exchange model parameters,
updates to these parameters, or partially constructed
models with the other participants. This intuition is il-
lustrated in Figure 2. There are several techniques in
this category, including federated learning deployed
by Google [33] on million of devices, e.g., for training
of predictive keyboards on character sequences that
users type on their phones.
ML Algorithms. As discussed above, ML involves creat-
ing models. These can be built using different approaches,
sometimes referred to as algorithms. Supervised learn-
ing techniques include Linear Regression, Logistic Regres-
sion, K-Nearest Neighbors, Decision Trees, Support Vec-
tor Machines, Random Forest, Naive Bayes, etc. For in-
stance, Logistic Regression is a linear model where the
probabilities describing the possible outcomes of a single
trial are modeled via a logistic (logit) function; the pa-
rameters of the model are estimated with maximum like-
lihood estimation, using an iterative algorithm. Unsuper-
vised learning algorithms include clustering ones–e.g., hi-
erarchical clustering, k-means, DBSCAN, etc.
Neural networks, which have attracted a lot of attention
in recent years, are also types of ML instantiations, where
learning can be either supervised or unsupervised. A neu-
ral net consists of a large number of simple processing
nodes that are densely interconnected, usually organized
into layers, to which weights are assigned. During train-
ing, weights are initially set to random values; as training
data passes through the layers, weights are continually ad-
justed until training data with the same labels consistently
yield similar outputs [24]. In particular, in deep neural net-
works (“deep learning”), each level learns to transform its
input data into a slightly more abstract and composite rep-
resentation; in fact, the word “deep” typically refers to the
number of layers through which the data is transformed.
Overall, choosing the right machine learning algorithm
depends on several factors, including, but not limited to:
data size, quality and diversity, as well as what answers
businesses want to derive from that data. Additional con-
siderations include accuracy, training time, parameters,
data points and much more. Therefore, the right choice
is typically both a combination of business need, specifica-
tion, experimentation, and time available.
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Figure 3: High-level illustration of differential privacy: an ad-
versary can distinguish between computation done on a dataset
with or without data X only with at most a small probability .
2.2 Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS)
Many cloud providers, including Microsoft, Amazon,
and IBM, have launched Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS) offerings, aimed to help clients benefit from ma-
chine learning without the cost, time, and risk of building
in-house infrastructure from scratch. MLaaS offers ready-
made, generic machine learning tools, such as predictive
analytics, APIs, data visualization, and natural language
processing, that can be adapted by small and medium sized
companies according to their needs.
Users who purchase MLaaS services can access these
tools via prediction APIs on a pay-per-query basis. Typical
image classification service costs around $1–$10 per 1,000
queries, depending on the customization and sophistication
of the machine learning model.
MLaaS services vary a lot across different providers. In
some cases, providers enable clients to download and de-
ploy machine learning models locally, while others only
allow clients to access machine learning models via a pre-
diction query interface, which provides both the predicted
label and the confidence score. The latter is much more
popular. Finally, some platforms also allow clients to up-
load their own models and charge others for using their
models.
2.3 Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for
Machine Learning
2.3.1 Cryptography
Cryptography, and more precisely encryption, can be used
to protect data confidentiality. There are two main primi-
tives that are relevant in the context of ML and in general
data analysis/processing: 1) secure multi-party computa-
tion (SMC), and 2) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).
SMC allows two or more parties to jointly compute a
function over their inputs, while keeping those inputs hid-
den from each other. Typically, SMC protocols build on
tools like garbled circuits, secret sharing, oblivious transfer
(for a detailed overview of such tools, we refer the reader
to https://securecomputation.org).
Whereas, FHE is an encryption scheme that allows pro-
cessing of the underlying cleartext data while it still re-
mains in encrypted form, and without giving away the se-
cret key. In other words, FHE allows (almost) arbitrary
computation over encrypted data.
2.3.2 Differential Privacy (DP)
DP addresses the paradox of learning nothing about an in-
dividual while learning useful information about a popula-
tion [15]. Generally speaking, it provides rigorous, statis-
tical guarantees against what an adversary can infer from
learning the result of some randomized algorithm.
Typically, differentially private techniques protect the
privacy of individual data subjects by adding random noise
when producing statistics. In other words, DP guarantees
that an individual will be exposed to the same privacy risk
whether or not her data is included in a differentially pri-
vate analysis, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Definition. Formally, for two non-negative numbers , δ, a
randomized algorithmA satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy
if and only if, for any neighboring datasets D and D′ (i.e.,
differing at most one record), and for the possible output
S ⊆ Range(A), the following formula holds:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ
The , δ parameters. Differential privacy analysis allows
for some information leakage specific to individual data
subjects, controlled by the privacy parameter . This mea-
sures the effect on each individual’s information on the out-
put of the analysis. With smaller values of , the dataset is
considered to have stronger privacy, but less accuracy, thus
reducing its utility. An intuitive description of  privacy
parameter, along with examples, is available in [39].
Sensitivity. The notion of the sensitivity of a function
is very useful in the design of differentially private al-
gorithms, and define the notion of sensitivity of a func-
tion with respect to a neighboring relationship. Given a
query F on a dataset D, the sensitivity is used to adjust
the amount of noise required for F (D). More formally, if
F is a function that maps a dataset (in matrix form) into a
fixed-size vector of real numbers, we can define the Li-
sensitivity of F as: Si(F ) = max
D,D′
||F (D) − F (D′)||i,
where || · ||i denotes the Li norm, i ∈ {1, 2} and D and D′
are any two neighboring datasets.
3 Privacy in ML
The security of any system is measured with respect the ad-
versarial goals and capabilities that it is designed to defend
against; to this end, we now discuss different threat mod-
els. Then, we attempt to provide a definition of privacy in
ML, focusing on the different types of attacks, which are
reviewed in detail in Section 4.
3.1 Adversarial Models
Overall, we focus on the privacy of the model. NB: adver-
sarial examples are out of the scope of this document. In
the rest of this section, we discuss adversarial goals related
to extracting information about the model or training data.
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When the model itself represents intellectual property—
e.g., in financial market systems—the model and its param-
eters should be kept private. In other contexts, it is impera-
tive that the privacy of the training data be preserved, e.g.,
medical applications. Regardless of the goal, the attacks
and defenses for them relate to exposing or preventing the
exposure of the model and training data.
Access. We first discuss what kind of access the attacker
might have:
• White-Box: she has some information about the
model or its original training data, e.g., ML algorithm
h, model parameters θ, network structure, or sum-
mary, partial, or full training data.
• Black-Box: she has no knowledge about the model.
Rather, she might explore a model by providing a se-
ries of carefully crafted inputs and observing outputs.
Inference vs training. Another variable is where the at-
tack might take place:
• Training Phase: the adversary attempts to learn the
model, e.g., accessing a summary, partial or all of
the training data. She might create a substitute model
(aka auxiliary model) to use to mount attacks on the
victim system.
• Inference Phase: the adversary collects evidence
about the model characteristics by observing infer-
ences made by it.
Passive vs Active. Finally, one can also distinguish be-
tween passive and active attacks, roughly mirroring the tra-
ditional distinction in security literature between honest-
but-curious and fully malicious adversaries. Consider for
instance federated learning, where the attacker is one of the
participants in the collaborative setting:
• Passive attack: the adversary passively observes the
updates and performs inference, e.g., without chang-
ing anything in the training procedure;
• Active attack: the adversary actively changes the why
she operates, e.g., in the case of federated learning,
by extending their local copy of the collaboratively
trained model with an augmented property classifier
connected to the last layer.
3.2 Types of attacks
Before delving into the state of the art in actual attacks, we
define what privacy means in the context of machine learn-
ing or, alternatively, what it means for a machine learning
model to breach privacy. Specific attacks proposed in liter-
ature are then reviewed in Section 4.
3.2.1 Inference about members of the population
• Statistical disclosure: the adversary learns something
about the input to the model from the model; in
theory, one would like to control statistical disclo-
sure (this is also known as the “Dalenius desidera-
tum” [10]), in that a model should reveal no more
about the input to which it is applied than would
have been known about this input without applying
the model. However, as also pointed out in [51], this
cannot be achieved by any useful model [14].
• Model inversion: an adversary can use the model’s
output to infer the values of sensitive attributes used
as input to the model. Note that it may not be possi-
ble to prevent this if the model is based on statistical
facts about the population : for example, suppose that
training the model has uncovered a high correlation
between a person’s externally observable phenotype
features and their genetic predisposition to a certain
disease; this correlation is now a publicly known fact
that allows anyone to infer information about the per-
son’s genome after observing that person [51].
• Inferring class representatives: overall, model inver-
sion can be generalized to potential breaches where
the adversary, given some access to the model, infers
features that characterize each class, making it possi-
ble to construct representatives of these classes.
3.2.2 Inference about members of the training dataset
Here the focus is on privacy of the individuals whose data
was used to train the model. This motivation is closely
related to the original goals of differential privacy [13]. Of
course, members of the training dataset are members of the
population, too. Therefore, one should focus on what the
model reveals about them beyond what it reveals about an
arbitrary member of the population:
• Membership inference: given a model and an exact
data point, the adversary infers whether this point was
used to train the model or not.
• Property inference: training data may not be identi-
cally distributed across different users whose records
are in the training set; unlike model inversion, the ad-
versary tries to infer properties that are true of a subset
of the training inputs but not of the class as a whole.
For instance, when Bob’s photos are used to train a
gender classifier, she infers that Alice appears in some
of the photos.
3.2.3 Inferring Model Parameters
As discussed earlier, MLaaS allows model owners to
charge others for queries to their commercially valuable
models. This pay-per-query deployment option exempli-
fies an increasingly common tension: on the one hand, the
query interface of an ML model may be widely accessible,
yet the model itself and the data on which it was trained
may be proprietary and confidential. Moreover, for secu-
rity applications such as spam or fraud detection, an ML
model’s secrecy is critical to its utility; an adversary that
can learn the model can also often evade detection [4].
In this space, we can distinguish between:
• Model Extraction: a black-box adversary that can
query an ML model to obtain predictions on input fea-
ture vectors, and may or may not know the model type
(e.g., logistic regression) or the distribution over the
4
data used to train the model. The adversary’s goal is
to extract an equivalent or near-equivalent ML model.
• Functionality Stealing: Rather than stealing the
model, here the ultimate goal is to create “knock-offs”
of the (black-box) model solely based on input-output
pairs observed from MLaaS queries [42].
4 Attacks
4.1 Membership Inference Attack (MIA)
As mentioned above, membership inference relates to the
problem of deciding, given a data point, whether or not it
was included in the training dataset.
4.1.1 Definition and Relevance
Formally, in a membership inference attack (MIA), the ad-
versary, given a target datapoint d∗ and some access to a
model hθ(x), tries to infer whether d∗ ∈ x. This can con-
stitute a serious privacy breach in a number of settings,
which we discuss next.
Sensitivity of task/model. First of all, MIA can directly
violate privacy if inclusion in a training set is itself sensi-
tive based on the nature of the task at hand. For example,
if health-related records (or images like MRIs) are used to
train a classifier, discovering that a specific record was used
for training inherently leaks information about the individ-
ual’s health. Similarly, if images from a database of crim-
inals are used to train a model predicting the probability
that one will re-offend, successful membership inference
exposes an individual’s criminal history.
Signal of leakage. When a record is fully known to the ad-
versary, learning that it was used to train a particular model
is an indication of information leakage through the model.
Overall, MIA is often considered to be a signal—a measur-
ing stick of sort—that access to a model leads to potentially
serious privacy breaches. In fact, MIAs are often a gateway
to further attacks: e.g., if the adversary infers that data of a
victim is part of the information she has access to she can
mount other attacks, like profiling, property inference, etc.
Establishing wrongdoing. On the other hand, MIA can
also be used by regulators to support the suspicion that a
model was trained on personal data without an adequate
legal basis, or for a purpose not compatible with the data
collection. For instance, DeepMind was recently found to
have used personal medical records provided by the UK’s
National Health Service for purposes beyond direct patient
care; the basis on which the data was collected [56].
MIA beyond machine learning. As a side note, we re-
mark that MIAs have been studied not only in the con-
text of machine learning, but also in other fields. Over-
all, given a data point d∗ and a function f(x), one can
define membership inference as the problem of determin-
ing whether d∗ is part of the input to the function f , i.e.,
d∗ ∈ x. Often, f is some aggregation function, and in fact
researchers have demonstrated the existence of successful
MIAs against aggregate statistics in the context of genomic
studies [27], location data [48], and noisy statistics in gen-
eral [16].
4.1.2 State of the Art
Attacking Machine Learning as a Service. MIA against
black-box machine learning models was first studied by
Shokri et al. [51], in the context of supervised learning.
They focus on classification models trained by commercial
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) providers, such as
Google and Amazon, whereby a user has API access to a
trained model.
More specifically, customers in possession of a dataset
and a data classification task can upload the dataset to the
MLaaS service and pay it to construct a model. The service
then makes the model available to the customer—typically
as a black-box API. This setting is illustrated in Figure 4.
For example, a mobile-app maker can use such a service
to analyze users’ activities and query the resulting model
inside the app to promote in-app purchases to users when
they are most likely to respond. Moreover, some machine-
learning services also let data owners expose their models
to external users for querying or even sell them.
Inference via overfitting. Shokri et al. [51]’s approach
exploits differences in the model’s response to inputs that
were or were not seen during training. For each class of
the targeted black-box model, they train a shadow model,
with the same machine learning technique; the intuition
is that the model ends up “overfitting” on data used for
training [51]. Overfitting is a modeling error that occurs
when a function is too closely fit to a limited set of data
points, and thus performs better on the training inputs than
on the inputs drawn from the same population but not used
during the training. Therefore, the attacker can exploit the
confidence values on inputs belonging to the same classes
and learn to infer membership.
Then, Salem et al. [49], although also building on over-
fitting signals, relax several adversarial assumptions—e.g.,
using multiple shadow models, knowledge of the target
model structure, and having a dataset from the same dis-
tribution as the target model’s training data—showing that
MIAs are very broadly applicable at low cost and thereby
pose a more severe risk than previously thought. Overall,
the attacks are relatively successful across the board, more
or less so depending on the adversary’s prior knowledge,
the datasets, the task at hand, etc.
ML and overfitting. Another line of work studies the
relationship between overfitting and information leakage.
In particular, Yeom et al. [58] assume that the adversary
knows the distribution from which the training set was
drawn and its size, and that the adversary colludes with
the training algorithm. Their attacks are close in perfor-
mance to Shokri et al.’s [51], and show that, besides over-
fitting, the influence of target attributes on model’s outputs
also correlates with successful attacks. Truex et al. [55]
extend [51] to a more general setting and show how mem-
bership inference attacks are largely transferable.
Generative models. While the research discussed above
focus on discriminative models, other work target genera-
tive models. As discussed in Section 2.1, they are used to
generate new samples from the same underlying distribu-
tion of a given training dataset, e.g., to artificially generate
plausible images and videos. Here the attacker targets a
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Figure 4: Membership inference attack against MLaaS in the
black-box setting [51].
MLaaS engine that provides synthetic samples on demand
– e.g., the user’s query is “provide an image sample of a
cat” – based on a trained generative model. Once again,
inferring whether specific data points are part of the train-
ing set for that generative model may constitute a serious
privacy breach. Note that membership inference on gen-
erative models is much more challenging than on discrim-
inative models: in the former, the attacker cannot exploit
confidence values on inputs belonging to the same classes,
and therefore it is more difficult to detect overfitting and
mount the attack.
Hayes et al. [25] consider both black-box and white-
box attacks: in the former, the adversary can only make
queries to the model under attack, i.e., the target model,
and has no access to the internal parameters. In the latter,
she also has access to the parameters. To mount the attacks,
they train a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [21]
on samples generated from the target model; i.e,, using
generative models as a method to learn information about
the target generative model, and thus create a local copy
of the target model from which they can launch the at-
tack. The intuition is that, if a generative model overfits,
then a GAN—which combines a discriminative model and
a generative model—should be able to detect this overfit-
ting, since the discriminator is trained to learn statistical
differences in distributions. Moreover, for white-box at-
tacks, the attacker-trained discriminator itself can be used
to measure information leakage of the target model.
Federated Learning. In this setting, the attack can be
mounted by an adversary, a participant in the federated
learning, attempting to infer whether a specific record is
part of the training set of either a specific or any partici-
pant. The first MIA against federated learning is presented
by Melis et al. [35], whose main intuition is to exploit un-
intended leakage from either the embedding layer (all deep
learning models operating on non-numeric data where the
input space is discrete and sparse first use an embedding
layer to transform inputs into a lower-dimensional vector
representation) or the gradients (in deep learning mod-
els, gradients are computed by back-propagating the loss
through the entire network from the last to the first layer).
An illustration of Melis et al. [35]’s attack is in Figure 5.
Then, Nasr et al. [37] design MIAs during the training
phase in a white-box setting, including passive and active
attackers based on the different adversary prior knowledge.
4.2 Model Inversion
As mentioned earlier, model inversion techniques aim to
infer class features and/or construct class representatives,
given that the adversary has some access (either black-box
or white-box) to a model.
4.2.1 Definition and Early Work
The concept of model inversion is introduced by Fredrik-
son et al. [17, 18]. First, they show how an attacker can rely
on outputs from a classifier to infer sensitive features used
as inputs to the model itself: given the model and some
demographic information about a patient whose records
are used for training, an attacker might predict sensitive
attributes of the patient. Then, they use so-called “hill-
climbing” on the output probabilities of a computer-vision
classifier to reveal individual faces from the training data.
These techniques are sometimes described as violating
privacy of the training data, even though the inferred fea-
tures characterize an entire class and not specifically the
training data, except in the cases of pathological overfit-
ting where the training sample constitutes the entire mem-
bership of the class.
4.2.2 Further Attacks
Collaborative learning. Hitaj et al. [26] show that a par-
ticipant in collaborative learning can use GANs to con-
struct class representatives. However, this technique has
been evaluated only on models where all members of the
same class are visually similar (handwritten digits and
faces). Thus, there is no evidence that it produces actual
training images or can distinguish a training image and an-
other image from the same class.
Aono et al. [3] show that, in the collaborative deep learn-
ing protocol of [50], an adversarial server can partially re-
cover participants’ data points from the shared gradient up-
dates, although in a greatly simplified setting where the
batch consists of a single data point.
Unintended Memorization. Song et al. [52] engineer a
machine learning model that memorizes the training data,
which can then be extracted with black-box access to the
model, without affecting the accuracy of the model on its
primary task.
Then, Carlini et al. [8] show that deep learning-based
generative sequence models trained on text data can unin-
tentionally memorize specific training inputs, which can
then be extracted with black-box access. Even though
the models are trained on text, extraction is demonstrated
only for sequences of digits (artificially introduced into the
text), which are not affected by the relative word frequen-
cies in the language model.
4.3 Property Inference
As mentioned above, work presented in [4, 17, 26] aimed
to infer properties that characterize an entire class: for ex-
ample, given a face recognition model where one of the
classes is Bob, infer what Bob looks like (e.g., Bob wears
glasses). However, while Ateniese et al. [4] are actually
6
Figure 5: Inference attacks against federated learning (passive adversary) by Melis et al. [35].
Figure 6: Samples from a GAN attack on a gender classification
model where the class is “female.”
the first, to the best of our knowledge, to reason about
extracting “something meaningful relating to properties of
the training set,” it is not clear that hiding this kind of in-
formation in a good classifier is possible or desirable.
4.3.1 Attacks
Melis et al. [35]’s work. By contrast, here we focus on
the adversarial goal of inferring properties that are true of a
subset of the training inputs but not of the class as a whole.
For instance, when Bob’s photos are used to train a gender
classifier, can the attacker infer that Alice appears in some
of the photos? In particular, Melis et al. [35] focus on the
properties that are independent of the class’s characteristic
features. In contrast to the face recognition example, where
“Bob wears glasses” is a characteristic feature of an en-
tire class, in their gender classifier study they infer whether
people in Bob’s photos wear glasses—even though wear-
ing glasses has no correlation with gender. There is no
“legitimate” reason for a model to leak this information; it
is purely an artifact of the learning process.
The work in [35] studies this kind of property inference
in the context of collaborative/federated learning. More
specifically, their intuition is that a participant’s contribu-
tion to each iteration of collaborative learning is based on
a batch of their training data, and the adversary can infer
single-batch properties, i.e., detect that the data in a given
batch has the property but other batches do not. She can
also infer when a property appears in the training data,
which has very serious privacy implications. For instance,
the adversary can infer when a certain person starts appear-
ing in a participant’s photos or when the participant starts
visiting a certain type of doctors. Finally, they infer proper-
ties that characterize a participant’s entire dataset (but not
the entire class), e.g., authorship of the texts used to train a
sentiment-analysis model.
Follow-up work. Ganju et al. [19] also develop prop-
erty inference attacks, mainly against fully connected, rel-
atively shallow neural networks. They focus on the post-
training, white-box release of models trained on sensitive
data, and the properties inferred by the adversary may or
may not be correlated with the main task.
4.4 Model and Functionality Stealing
Finally, we look into adversarial efforts toward inferring
model parameters.
4.4.1 Model Extraction
The concept of model stealing, or extraction, is first pre-
sented by Tramer et al. [54]. In this kind of attack, an
adversary with black-box access, but no prior knowledge
of an ML model’s parameters or training data, aims steal
the model parameters. The intuition behind their attack is
to exploit the information-rich outputs returned by the ML
prediction APIs, e.g., high-precision confidence values in
addition to class labels.
Consider the case of ML algorithms like logistic regres-
sion: the confidence value is a simple log-linear function
1/(1+e−(w·x+β)) of the d-dimensional input vector x. By
querying d + 1 random d-dimensional inputs, an attacker
can with high probability solve for the unknown d + 1
parameters w and β defining the model. (Such equation-
solving attacks extend to multi-class logistic regressions
and neural networks).
Overall, Tramer et al. [54]’s work is focused on inferring
model parameters. In follow-up work, other researchers
have then gone a step further and perform hyperparameter
stealing [57], architecture extraction [40], etc. In the for-
mer, the focus is on hyperparameters, rather than param-
eters, which are configurations external to the model and
whose values cannot be estimated from data. In the latter,
a black-box adversary succeeds to infer (hidden) model ar-
chitectures (e.g., the type of non-linear activation) of neu-
ral networks in MLaaS as well as their optimization pro-
cesses (e.g., stochastic gradient descent or ADAM).
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4.4.2 Functionality Extraction
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the goal of functionality ex-
traction is, rather than to steal the model, to create “knock-
offs.” In [42], Orekondy et al. do so solely based on input-
output pairs observed from MLaaS queries. More specif-
ically, the adversary interacts with a black-box “victim”
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) by providing it in-
put images and obtaining respective predictions. The re-
sulting image-prediction pairs are used to train a knock-off
model, e.g., to compete with the victim model at the vic-
tim’s task.
Additional work in this category includes [44], whereby
the adversary trains a local model to substitute for a vic-
tim deep neural network (DNN), using inputs synthetically
generated by an adversary and labeled by the target DNN.
4.5 Take Aways
Throughout this section, we have presented and discussed
the state of the art in attacks against privacy in ML.
Membership inference attacks are real. As evident from
the above discussion, there has been a very significant
amount of research work on membership inference attacks
against ML. Arguably, this is motivated by 1) the serious-
ness of the privacy risks stemming from such attacks, 2)
the fact that MIA is often just a signal of leakage and can
serve as a canary for broad privacy issues, and 3) the in-
teresting challenges in making attacks more effective, less
reliant on strong assumptions, etc.
Overall, several attacks have been proposed in the con-
text of a wide variety of datasets (images, text, etc.), mod-
els (discriminative, generative, federated), as well as threat
models (API access, white-box, black-box, active, pas-
sive, etc.). Such attacks are realistic but obviously their
effectiveness depends on the actual settings, e.g., adver-
sary’s knowledge of records, model parameters, etc., and
are likely to affect certain users more than others.
While we discuss possible defenses and the overall out-
look, respectively, in Section 5 and ??, we are confident
in arguing that MIAs are a real problem that at the very
least should make practitioners and researchers question
whether deploying ML models in the wild is a good idea,
privacy-wise, whenever training data is sensitive. How-
ever, further work is needed to provide clear guidelines
and usable tools for practitioners willing to provide ac-
cess to trained model to fully understand the privacy risks,
on their specific data/specific learning task, for the users
whose data is used for training.
Limitations of model inversion. Although research
roughly falling in the “model inversion” category is im-
portant, we believe there are some limitations in what they
mean for privacy. Class members produced by model in-
version and GANs are similar to the training inputs only
if all members of the class are similar, as is the case for
MNIST (the dataset of handwritten digit used in [26]) and
facial recognition. This does not violate privacy of the
training data; it simply shows that machine learning works
as it should. A trained classifier reveals the input features
characteristic of each class, thus enabling the adversary to
sample from the class population. For instance, Figure 6
shows GAN-constructed images for the gender classifica-
tion task on the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset,
taken from [35]. These images show a generic female face,
but there is no way to tell from them whether an image of
a specific female was used in training or not.
Therefore, the informal property violated by such at-
tacks is, roughly speaking: “a classifier should prevent
users from generating an input that belongs to a particu-
lar class or even learning what such an input looks like.”
However, it is not clear why this property is desirable or
whether it is even achievable. In fact, this motivated us to
study what we defined as property inference attacks.
Property inference needs further work. Overall, prop-
erty inference attacks are not to be ignored, even though,
their effectiveness depends on the context. As mentioned
earlier, inferring sensitive attributes is really a privacy
breach when the attacker can confidently assess that those
attributes related to records in the training set, and even
more so if they do not leak simply because the class the
model is learning to classify is strictly correlated.
So really the only “attack” in this sense we are aware
of is that of Melis et al. [35], which has only been stud-
ied in the context of collaborative learning. Even in that
case, the authors essentially show that the accuracy of the
attack quickly degrades with increasing number of partici-
pants. In fact, if this is large enough, then differentially pri-
vate defenses based on the moments accountant method [1]
(discussed in Section 5) can be used to thwart such attacks.
It remains however an open research questions to inves-
tigate whether property inference attacks: 1) are possible,
as per our definition, in non collaborative learning settings
and at scale, and 2) can be thwarted in collaborative set-
tings involving a small number of participants. (We discuss
the latter in more detail Section 5.)
5 Defenses
Overall, we can categorize defenses against attacks dis-
cussed in this document and in general aiming to protect
confidentiality and privacy in ML based on the main tools
they rely on. These include advanced privacy-enhancing
technologies like cryptography and differential privacy (re-
viewed in Section 2.3) as well approaches used as part of
the learning process (mainly, training) to reduce informa-
tion available to the adversary.
5.1 Cryptography
Cryptography in ML can support confidential computing
scenarios where, for instance, a server has a model trained
on its private data and wishes to provide inferences (e.g.,
classification) on clients’ private data. In this context, there
are a number of research proposals and prototypes in lit-
erature, which allow the client to obtain the inference re-
sult without revealing their input to the server, while at the
same preserving the confidentiality of the server’s model.
For instance, privacy-enhancing tools based on secure
multi-party computation (SMC) and fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) have been proposed to securely train su-
pervised machine learning models, such as matrix factor-
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ization [38], linear classifiers [6, 22], decision trees [7, 31],
linear regressors [12], and neural networks [5, 11, 32, 36].
SMC has also been used to build privacy-preserving
neural networks in a distributed fashion. For instance, Se-
cureML [36] starts with the data owners (clients) distribut-
ing their private training inputs among two non-colluding
servers during the setup phase; the two servers then use
MPC to train a global model on the clients’ encrypted joint
data. Then, Bonawitz et al. [5] use secure multi-party ag-
gregation techniques, tailored for federated learning, to let
participants encrypt their updates so that the central param-
eter server only recovers the sum of the updates.
Confidentiality vs Privacy. Overall, cryptography in ML
is really aimed at protecting confidentiality, rather than
privacy, which constitutes the main focus of our report.
The two terms are often confused, both in the context
of ML and in general, but they actually refer to differ-
ent properties. Confidentiality is an explicit design prop-
erty whereby one party wants to keep information (e.g.,
training data, testing data, model parameters, etc.) hid-
den from both the public and other parties (e.g., clients
with respect to servers or vice-versa). Whereas, privacy is
about protecting against unintended information leakage,
whereby an adversary aims to infer sensitive information
through some (intended) interaction with the victim. In
other words, cryptographically-enforced confidential com-
puting does not provide any guarantees about what the out-
put of the computation reveals. Therefore, we will focus on
privacy rather than confidentiality defenses.
5.2 Differential Privacy (DP)
The state-of-the-art method for providing access to infor-
mation free from inferences is to satisfy differential pri-
vacy (DP) [13]. This applies to ML as well, and more pre-
cisely to providing access to models that have been trained
on (sensitive) datasets [1, 43, 46, 47, 50]. More precisely,
there are two main privacy-preserving model-training ap-
proaches in literature: 1) using noisy stochastic gradient
descent (noisy SGD) [2], and 2) Private Aggregation of
Teacher Ensembles (PATE) [43, 46].
Noisy SGD. As mentioned in Section 2.1, ML models are
often used trained using stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
The intuition is to add noise to the SGD process; however,
the main challenge is to do so while ensuring that the noise
is carefully calibrated. The sensitivity of the final value
of θ (the parameter vector) to the elements of the training
data is generally hard to analyze. On the other hand, since
the training data affects θ only via the gradient computa-
tions, one may achieve privacy by bounding gradients (by
clipping) and by adding noise to those computations. In a
nutshell, this is the idea behind the seminal work by Abadi
et al. [1], in particular in the accounting of the privacy loss,
and hence it is general referred to as the Moments Accoun-
tant algorithm.
PATE. To protect the privacy of training data during
learning, PATE transfers knowledge from an ensemble of
“teacher” models trained on partitions of the data to a “stu-
dent” model; see Figure 7. Intuitively, privacy is provided
by training teachers on disjoint data, and strong guarantees
stem from noisy aggregation of teachers’ answers.
Collaborative Learning. In the collaborative learning set-
ting, Shokri and Shmatikov [50] support distributed train-
ing of deep learning networks in a privacy-preserving way.
Specifically, their system relies on the input of indepen-
dent entities which aim to collaboratively build a machine
learning model without sharing their training data. To this
end, they selectively share subsets of noisy model param-
eters during training. Moreover, federated learning pro-
posals, which have already mentioned, tackle the problem
of training deep learning models with differential privacy
guarantees for the tasks of training language models [34]
and digits classification [20].
5.3 Trusted Execution Environments
A different line of work focuses on privacy (as well as in-
tegrity) guarantees for ML computations in untrusted en-
vironments (i.e., tasks outsourced by a client to a remote
server, including MLaaS) by leveraging so-called Trusted
Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX or
ARM TrustZone. TEEs use hardware and software pro-
tections to isolate sensitive code from other applications,
while attesting to its correct execution. The main idea is
that TEEs outperform purely cryptographic approaches by
multiple orders of magnitude.
In this area, there are three main approaches. The
first includes work supporting oblivious data access pat-
terns [41] and in general training for a range of ML algo-
rithms run inside SGX [28, 29]. The second, by Tramer
and Boneh [53], focuses on high performance execution
of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in TEEs, by efficiently
partitioning DNN computations between trusted and un-
trusted devices. The third, by Hanzlik et al. [23], is es-
sentially a guarded offline deployment of MLaaS: models
are executed locally on the client’s side (therefore, the data
never leaves the device).
5.4 ML-Specific Approaches
Finally, a number of ML techniques are used to reduce in-
formation available to the adversary to mount their attacks.
For instance, dropout is a popular technique often used to
mitigate overfitting in neural networks; as such, this might
reduce the effectiveness of MIAs based on overfitting.
Additional techniques in this space include weight nor-
malization (re-parameterization of the weights vectors that
decouples the length of those weights from their direction),
dimensionality reduction (e.g., only using inputs that occur
many times in the training data), selective gradient sharing
(in collaborative learning, participants could share only a
fraction of their gradients during each update), etc.
6 Conclusion
This document provided a literature review on privacy and
machine learning. We provided ample background infor-
mation on relevant concepts, including machine learning,
differential privacy, etc., as well as adversarial models.
Then, we presented a wide range of attacks that relate to
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Figure 7: Overview of PATE’s approach [46].
private and/or sensitive information leakage. Finally, we
discussed recent results attempting to defend against such
attacks. Next, we list three areas where further work is
desperately needed.
6.1 Severity of Attacks
Overall, our review showed that there exists a large body
of literature presenting a wide range of different attacks.
Specifically, we covered membership inference attacks
(MIAs), model inversion, property inference, as well as
model and functionality stealing attacks.
We concluded that membership inference attacks are
very much possible, but it is hard to grasp the real-world
effect on actually deployed models due to the lack of case
studies vis-a-vis impact on actual users, relation to adver-
sary’s prior knowledge, etc. We also offered a critic of
model inversion attacks, while covering less studied at-
tacks in the field of property inference and model steal-
ing. Much work is left to be done – especially considering
ways to provide guidelines and evaluation framework for
practitioners.
6.2 Policy Implications and Further Study
Needed
The implication of the attacks covered in this manuscript
vis-a-vis policy and data protection is also largely unex-
plored. The only exception in this context is the work
by Cohen and Nissim [9], which rephrases privacy attacks
in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) frame-
work and more specifically within the “singling out” con-
cept. While the GDPR heavily focuses on the concept of
identification, what it means for a person to be “identi-
fied, directly or indirectly” is not clear. As pointed in [9],
Recital 26 sheds a little more light: “To determine whether
a natural person is identifiable account should be taken of
all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling
out, either by the controller or by another person to identify
the natural person directly or indirectly.”
Therefore, singling out is one way to identify a person in
data, and only data that does not allow singling out may be
excepted from the regulation. Clearly, more work linking
up privacy attacks (and defenses) with regulation and data
protection efforts needs to ramp up.
6.3 Need for Better Evaluations
Overall, several defense techniques against privacy attacks
have been proposed over the past few years. However,
it is very hard to assess how generalizable they are and
what is the trade-off they incur with respect to privacy and
utility. This prompts the need for a more thorough eval-
uation of how defenses fare in practice, vis-a-vis realistic
use cases and datasets, rather than the standard public ones
that, more often than not, say little or nothing about real-
world performance.
In this context, some recent work has taken some good
steps in the right direction; for instance, Jayaraman and
Evans [30] study the impact of variable choices of the  pa-
rameter, different variants of differential privacy, and sev-
eral learning tasks on both utility and privacy (including
in the context of MIAs) for privacy-preserving machine
learning. Alas, however, their main finding is that there is
no way to obtain privacy for free?relaxed definitions of dif-
ferential privacy that reduce the amount of noise needed to
improve utility also increase the privacy leakage. In other
words, current mechanisms for differentially private ma-
chine learning rarely offer acceptable utility-privacy trade-
offs for complex learning tasks: settings that provide lim-
ited accuracy loss provide little effective privacy, and set-
tings that provide strong privacy result in useless models.
Once again, this points to the need to better understand
where trade-offs are possible, in what context, and at what
expenses, rather than hoping to deploy generic, one-size-
fits-all defenses across the board.
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